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Abstract
The most fundamental problem in the philosophy of art is finding an adequate definition for the
term ‘art’. One common criterion is that a definition of art should be able to accommodate future,
avant-garde works, as well as acknowledge the many accepted works from the past, which in all
likelihood these newer additions do not resemble. Some philosophers also believe that a definition of
art should align reasonably well with our intuitions about what counts as art. I would agree, except my
intuitions about what counts as art are apparently off from what most other people think qualifies as
art. At least today, many people take a relatively liberal approach, opening their arms to many instances
of all kinds of works. I tend to conceive of art more narrowly. I am much more skeptical of the idea that
things like movies, architecture, and music often count as art. I would claim that many instances of these
kinds of works, among others, should not and most likely do not qualify as art. I believe that the
definition of art described by J.O. Urmson might be used to winnow what I perceive to be today’s
overcrowded field of art. Under the definition provided by Urmson, for a work to qualify as art, it must
be primarily intended for aesthetic consideration. I argue that many works of film, architecture, and
music, among others, are not primarily intended for aesthetic consideration, and thus do not qualify as
art.

2

Urmson’s Art
The most fundamental problem in the philosophy of art is finding an adequate definition for the
term ‘art’. One common criterion is that a definition of art should be able to accommodate future,
avant-garde works, as well as acknowledge the many accepted works from the past, which in all
likelihood these newer additions do not resemble. Some philosophers also believe that a definition of
art should align reasonably well with our intuitions about what counts as art. I would agree, except my
intuitions about what counts as art are apparently off from what most other people think qualifies as
art. At least today, many people take a relatively liberal approach, opening their arms to many instances
of all kinds of works. I tend to conceive of art more narrowly. I am much more skeptical of the idea that
things like movies, architecture, and music often count as art. I would claim that many instances of these
kinds of works, among others, should not and most likely do not qualify as art.
The definition of art I have thus found most appealing is that put forward by J.O. Urmson.
According to Urmson, art can most usefully be understood to be artifacts primarily intended for
aesthetic consideration. Those artifacts not primarily intended for aesthetic consideration are excluded
from the classification art. I will argue that many works of film and architecture, among others, might be
excluded from this classification, on the grounds that we can often find more plausible purposes besides
aesthetic consideration for which they are primarily intended. By arguing in this way I hope to shrink
what I consider to be the overcrowded field of art. Entire art forms need not be eliminated, but many
instances of the artifacts that fall under certain art forms might be weeded out.
My paper will contain two sections. In the first section I will parse Urmson’s definition of art as
best I can. In the second section I will apply the definition to certain art forms e.g. movies, architecture,
and argue that more plausible purposes than aesthetic consideration can be assigned to them.
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I.
In this section I will parse the definition of art supplied by Urmson. According to J.O. Urmson,
art can most usefully be understood to be artifacts primarily intended for aesthetic consideration
(Urmson, 22). The first three questions raised by this definition are: what counts as an artifact,
intended by whom, and what counts as aesthetic consideration. I will answer them in that order.
What counts as an artifact? A passage from George Dickie’s The New Institutional Theory of Art
will be helpful here, as he takes artifactuality to be a necessary condition of art. Dickie starts off with
the dictionary definition: an object made by man, especially with a view to subsequent use (Dickie,
216). But there are those artifacts that do not fit this definition well. Dickie gives the example of a
piece of unaltered driftwood that someone uses to dig a hole with. In that case, the driftwood alone is
not the artifact, rather it is the driftwood being manipulated and used in a certain way. In this way,
complex objects involving unaltered natural objects might attain the status of artifact. Clearer cut
examples of artifacts include things like tools, buildings, automobiles, and so on. Many types of things
that people might consider to be art would fall into the category of artifact as well, including things like
movies, music, poetry, paintings, sculptures, and so on. Things like sunsets, trees, the northern lights,
mountains, animals, and flowers would not count as artifacts, unless we agree with Dickie that they
can figure into a complex object that qualifies as an artifact. Not being artifacts on their own, these
natural things, by themselves at least, are all denied the status of art. We might worry that this
conception of artifactuality is still too narrow, that it excludes things like performance art, or
conceptual art, which do not have a clear-cut object. In defense of Dickie’s account, we might argue
that the human involvement in each of the two kinds of art would be enough for the piece or
performance to qualify as an object with artifact status. Or we might alter the original dictionary
definition of artifact to something (not necessarily an object) produced by humans, and so try and
account for conceptual and performance art. Or we might even take a page from Wittgenstein and just
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say that artifacts are a family of these kinds of things, and then list off some examples, as he does with
games. Depending on what you want to exclude from the category art you can adopt a narrower or
broader definition of artifact.
On the other hand, you might prefer to drop this part of the definition altogether. In Philosophy
of Art Noel Carrol provides a somewhat similar aesthetic definition of art:
x is an artwork if and only if (1) x is produced with the intention that it possess a certain
capacity, namely (2) the capacity of affording aesthetic experience. (Carroll, 162)
We might rework the definition, substituting in the components of Urmson’s definition to get:
x is an artwork if and only if it is primarily intended for aesthetic consideration.
The part of the definition having to do with artifactuality is done away with, while the rest of the
definition is maintained. We still have intention and aesthetic consideration, but need not concern
ourselves with whether the work counts as an artifact. This might more easily allow us to include things
like performance pieces and conceptual art in our art classification. Though we might worry that other
things will now be let in that were not before.
Answers to the second two questions might prove even more elusive. Whose intentions are we
concerned with, and what counts as aesthetic consideration? Urmson does not deal with the first of
these two questions at all, yet this question concerning intentions might be the easier of the two. An
obvious candidate for whose intentions we must look at is the person who made the artifact. However,
questions might further arise if the person who made the artifact is not the artist e.g. in the case of
architecture you have people who take part in the actual building of the structure compared to those
merely involved in the design. Further questions might arise if more than one person had a part in
making the artifact e.g. movies have writers, directors, actors, and so on. We must figure out whether
to look at the intention of the artist, the actual maker/s of the artifact (who might or might not be the
artist), the person/people who commissioned the work, or some combination thereof. The artist is
5

another obvious candidate, but that might be putting the cart before the horse in this case. Urmson
gives us a definition of art, not a definition of artist, and so we might define artist in terms of the
definition of art he provides. An artist is someone who creates artifacts primarily intended for
aesthetic consideration. Yet, what I am in part trying to determine in this paper is whether certain
artifacts were intended so, and if they were not then there might be no artist to begin with, but
instead a craftsman or some other sort of creator. So we might merely look and see whether an artist
was involved in order to determine an artifact’s status as art or not. We might think, if there is no artist
involved then there is no art, and if there is an artist involved then there is art. If we grant that artists
can be involved in the making of non-art, however, then merely determining whether an artist was
involved will not settle the question. Assuming an artist can create an artifact primarily intended for
something other than aesthetic consideration, then the idea that an artist can create non-art is no
problem at all.
We must look at the intention behind each specific artifact to determine whether that individual
artifact qualifies as art. Mediums like film and music might be helpful in figuring out the puzzle at hand.
In the case of film there is what is known as the auteur theory, which holds that the director is the
“author” of a film. Someone who holds to this theory, and even many who might not profess it, would
take the director to be the artist, if in fact the film is a work of art. In the case of many if not most films,
however, the director does not have free reign. They often must answer to and take orders from the
people who are supplying the money for the picture e.g. investors, studio executives, and the like. If this
is the case, then the director’s intentions might be undermined or overridden by such people. If the
investors or executives have different intentions than the director, and they are able to affect the
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production of the film, then their intentions must also be taken into account, and if their intentions are
not primarily aesthetic then the film’s status as art, based on Urmson’s definition, might be denied.
Music today, at least mainstream music, is much the same way. You have creatives who must answer to
those putting up the money, which in the case of the music industry would likely be the record
companies. In collaborative works like these the answer to the question of whose intentions must be
taken into account becomes quite complicated, especially when compared to a painter working on his or
her own.
So whose intentions we must look at will vary depending on the type of work, and even on the
specific individual work. A bit vague if not unreasonable answer, given the drastic differences in the
nature of various art forms. There are some other things that Noel Carrol points out about intentions
that it would also be good to note here (Carrol 1999, 164). First, there may be other intentions involved
in the creation of the work. It is not necessary that the work be intended solely for aesthetic
consideration, only that it primarily be, given Urmson’s definition. Second, with intentions in the
definition we are able to account for bad art. Bad art would be those works primarily intended for
aesthetic consideration which fail to realize this intention. Third, we might worry that referencing
intentions will prove too problematic for the definition. Intentions are found in the mind, so how can
we figure out what a person intends?
Carroll seems rather optimistic about this. For one, we can look at the work itself, which might give
evidence of intention. We can examine the work and infer the presence of certain intentions. This is no
different than what is normally done. In everyday contexts, situations, conversations, and so on, we
infer certain intentions as the best explanations to behavior. In the same way we might look at a work
and based on it infer the intentions behind it. In addition to the work itself we can look at the medium
or category of the work e.g. film, book, painting. If a work belongs to a category where aesthetic
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consideration is not standardly the primary intention, then we have a better idea what intentions are or
are not behind the work.
There are those who are less optimistic than Carroll. Within the philosophy of mind as well as
the philosophy of art there are ongoing debates over both the availability and desirability of intentions.
In The Intentional Fallacy W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley take an anti-intentionalist stance. They
claim that the intentions of a person are neither desirable nor available. A work must be judged on its
own. If the artist was successful in conveying their intentions in the work, then the work will suffice to
show this, the artist need not be consulted. If the work does not successfully convey the intentions of
the artist then they are not relevant, for they are not part of the work, and only the work should be
examined. On the other end of the spectrum from Wimsatt and Beardsley is the extreme form of actual
intentionalism, which holds that the meaning of an artwork is fully determined by the actual intentions
of the artist who created it. This extreme form of intentionalism leads to the untenable idea that the
creator of a work could make it mean anything just from the fact that they will it so. On this view, we
would have to take a blue sculpture to be pink if the artist claims it is pink. Extreme actual intentionalism
is therefore very unattractive, but it is not the only form of intentionalism. In his paper Interpretation
and Intention Noel Carroll puts forth and defends a form of intentionalism he calls modest actual
intentionalism. According to this version of intentionalism an artist’s intentions are relevant to the
interpretation of a work, but they do not fully determine the interpretation of the work. The artist’s
actual intentions constrain our interpretation of a work. For a modest actual intentionalist the correct
interpretation of a work is the meaning of the work that is compatible with the artist’s actual intentions.
When the work supports more than one possible meaning the correct interpretation of the work,
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according to the modest actual intentionalist, is the one that is compatible with the creator’s actual
intention, which itself must be supported by the work (Carrol, 76).
An alternative to modest actual intentionalism is hypothetical intentionalism, according to
which the meaning of a work is what an ideal spectator would hypothesize the meaning of the work to
be. The ideal spectator must be fully informed about the cultural background of the work, the creator’s
other works, publicly available information about the work and its creator, and the work itself. Modest
actual intentionalism also permits the use of these things by a person trying to determine the meaning
of a work. Where modest actual intentionalism and hypothetical intentionalism differ is that
hypothetical intentionalism does not allow information not publicly available to the spectator to be used
in interpreting the meaning of a work. On the hypothetical intentionalism view the
interpretation/meaning of a work is constrained by the best hypotheses available about what the
creator intended, as opposed to their actual intentions.
The debate over intentions, their availability and desirability, rages on. I do not mean to settle
that debate here, but a brief summary of my own position is in order. I reject both extreme positions:
the anti-intentionalism of Beardsley and Wimsatt, and the extreme form of actual intentionalism. I am
inclined to take the position of the modest actual intentionalist, the same as Carroll. One reason for
this is that modest actual intentionalism lines up with the way we ordinarily interpret things. When we
try to interpret a person’s behavior and speech we try to get at their actual intentions. It is not
outrageous to think we might do the same when it comes to the works a person creates. However, one
need not necessarily endorse this version of intentionalism in order to accept the definition of art
offered by Urmson. At the least one will need to reject the anti-intentionalism advocated by Wimsatt
and Beardsley, and acknowledge that intentions play a role in determining the meaning of a work.
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That still leaves us with the question: what counts as aesthetic consideration? In Philosophy of
Art Carroll notes that there are several uses of the term aesthetic (156-157). The one found in Urmson’s
definition is adjectival, it modifies the noun “consideration”. This leaves us with the task of identifying
what is distinctive about aesthetic consideration compared to other sorts of consideration. In What
Makes a Situation Aesthetic? Urmson begins his investigation by trying to do just that. He distinguishes
the aesthetic from things like the moral, the economic, the personal, and the intellectual. He compares
various types of satisfaction one might gain from a play. The very fact that one gains satisfaction does not
guarantee that we are dealing with the aesthetic. We must look at the source of the satisfaction to
determine this. A person may gain moral satisfaction from a play because they believe it will bring about
some improvement on the lives or behavior of the audience. One might gain economic satisfaction from
having invested in a financially successful play, or intellectual satisfaction from a play’s ability to
overcome various technical problems faced in the theater. Though not mutually exclusive these types of
satisfaction are all distinct from what we would refer to as aesthetic satisfaction. According to Urmson, in
order to establish whether something like satisfaction or appreciation is aesthetic, economic, moral, or
some other kind, we have to look at the explanation for the reaction one has to the work. If a person
explains that they are satisfied by a play because of the money they are going to make off of it their
satisfaction is obviously economic. If they take satisfaction in a play because their child is performing in it
then their satisfaction is clearly personal. That leaves us with the question: what sort of explanation
points to aesthetic, as opposed to moral, economic, and so on?
Before answering this question, we should note that the aesthetic is not limited to works of art.
While Urmson would likely deny that things like sunsets and flowers are art he does not deny that we
can have aesthetic satisfaction and appreciation for these things. We can aesthetically appreciate many
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things that are not art, including those artifacts not primarily intended for such appreciation. Urmson’s
definition demarcates things into three classes: non-artifacts, non-art artifacts, and art artifacts. What
makes the difference between non-art artifacts and art artifacts is the primary intention of the work. A
carpenter might build two tables, one intended primarily for aesthetic consideration, the other not.
Though both may be aesthetically appreciated, only the one primarily intended so will qualify as art.
Given that the aesthetic can apply to non-art as well, Urmson does not seek to understand the aesthetic
by simply marking off and examining a special class of objects.
When discussing Urmson’s positive account of the aesthetic we should note first off that he uses
consideration, appreciation, and evaluation interchangeably (23). In the definition first given Urmson
refers to aesthetic consideration, but then to aesthetic appreciation, and finally evaluation. Though not
exactly synonymous the three terms are not completely dissimilar either. All three involve an element of
reflection, or analysis, over and above mere perception. In considering, appreciating, or evaluating a
thing one is not merely perceiving its qualities, but analyzing what one takes in and making a judgement
about it.
Getting back to the original question: what explanation points to the aesthetic? Urmson first
appeals to sensible (relating to the senses) qualities as grounds for aesthetic consideration,
appreciation, etc. He states, “If we examine, then, some very simple cases of aesthetic evaluation it
seems to me that the grounds given are frequently the way the object appraised looks (shape and
color), the way it sounds, smells, tastes or feels” (23). For a simple case of aesthetic evaluation Urmson
gives the example of a rose bush. When evaluating a rose bush aesthetically Urmson suggests that the
most obvious grounds will be the way it smells, though we can also look at its coloring, or the shape of
its petals and leaves. These grounds are basic in nature; they require no further explanation. In What
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Makes a Situation Aesthetic? Urmson himself says that he, in this paper, wants to avoid cases of highly
complex works of art. He nevertheless provides an example of such a work and what we might attend to
when evaluating it. In the case of more complex works of art Urmson gives the example of Shakespeare’s
Hamlet. In evaluating it and other similarly complex narrative works we will refer to things such as
masterly style, subtle characterization, and inevitability of the action, among other things.
Along with sensible qualities Urmson gives another criterion for appreciating works in slightly
more complex cases, though not those on the level of truly complex works like Hamlet. This second type
of criterion Urmson identifies as non-aesthetically desirable qualities. For example, we might admire a
building because it looks a certain way, say strong or spacious. We might appreciate a sports car
because it looks fast, and also for having pleasing sensible qualities e.g. the color of its paint. According
to Urmson, what makes this second criterion grounds for aesthetic appreciation is that it deals with the
way a thing looks, as opposed to whether it actually has that characteristic. Thus, for Urmson,
consideration of the aesthetic kind, in the case of simple works, involves considering the sensible as well
as the non-aesthetically desirable qualities an artifact has. In the case of a complex work like Hamlet we
will consider its style, characterization, and action, among other things. An explanation that points to
the aesthetic would thus, for Urmson, be one involving the kinds of qualities he proposed.
Given the brevity and incompleteness of Urmson’s account it might be best to supplement it
with what Noel Carroll puts forward in his book Philosophy of Art. In this case, aesthetic consideration
can be understood as the attention to and contemplation of a work’s aesthetic properties. Aesthetic
properties include, but are not limited to, things like emotion properties (“somber”, “melancholic”),
character properties (“bold”, “stately”), Gestalt properties (“unified”, “balanced”), and taste properties
(“gaudy”, “vulgar”).
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In this section I attempted to parse the definition of art J.O. Urmson gives in his paper What
Makes a Situation Aesthetic? According to Urmson, art can most usefully be understood as artifacts
primarily intended for aesthetic consideration. I raised and answered what I think are three important
questions: what counts as an artifact? Whose intentions must be considered? And, what counts as
aesthetic consideration? An artifact is often some object created by humans with an eye for subsequent
use. Yet we might try and broaden, or drop altogether, the conception of artifact to include things like
performance and conceptual art. Whose intentions we must consider will vary with the type of art we
consider. When looking at a film or piece of music we may have to consider the intentions of multiple
persons, whereas with a painting or sculpture we may often only be concerned with the individual
painter’s and sculptor’s intention. For Urmson, the simplest cases of aesthetic consideration involve
considering, appreciating, and evaluating the sensible and non-aesthetically desirable qualities of a
work. We might supplement this account of aesthetic consideration with a fuller account like the one
provided by Carroll, where aesthetic consideration can be understood as the attention to and
contemplation of a work’s aesthetic properties.
As stated in the introduction, my impetus for employing Urmson’s definition or art is to cast
suspicion on the overcrowded field of things that today many people think qualify as art. This
restructuring of the boundaries of art may not be to everyone’s taste, so now I want to briefly outline
some benefits of the definition. Rather than coming at the issue with an indiscriminate cleaver, the
definition allows us to weed out unqualified works with more precision. Works are evaluated on an
individual basis, rather than as a collective. This prevents a bias for or against a certain medium or genre
from holding sway over what gets classified as art. At the same time the definition allows for avantgarde works to qualify as art. The only restrictions are that the work must be an artifact (and not even
that if you reformulate the definition as was done earlier), and must have the proper primary intention
behind it. There are no rules restricting art to preexisting mediums, types, or genres. In addition to these
13

things, the definition lines up with the idea of creators and artists being constrained by the expectations
of the time period in which they create their works. The conventions of the times will inform what
intentions go into a work. Thus, if a person is working in a field not considered to be an art medium,
then they will not likely look to create something in that field that is primarily intended for aesthetic
purposes. This does not preclude someone from making a work of art in a traditionally non-artistic
genre/medium that breaks with convention. The definition allows for such works, so long as the proper
intention is there.
II.
A disclaimer may be in order. I am not arguing that this definition of art is the best, or that it is
without flaws, or that it cannot be better formulated. I simply think that the definition has a certain
utility. That in applying it we can call into question and possibly disqualify from the classification art
works I would rather not have in that classification.
I want to first give my argument in its most distilled, basic form. Under the definition I employ in
this paper, art comprises those artifacts primarily intended for aesthetic consideration. I think that many
works of architecture, movies, and music, among other supposed artistic mediums, are primarily
intended for things other than aesthetic consideration. Therefore, many works of architecture, movies,
and music, among other kinds of works e.g. dishes of food, might not qualify as art. While some of these
kinds of works likely qualify as art under the chosen definition, many might not. This does not mean that
those works primarily intended for something other than aesthetic consideration cannot be
aesthetically considered. They can be, but given the definition we must look to the intentions of those
involved in the creation of the artifact to correctly determine the artifact’s status as art or not.
In the case of architecture, I would contend that the primary intention would instead be some
mundane utilitarian function like providing a sheltered environment. For movies and music, it would be
14

entertainment. On the other hand, I believe that in many cases things like paintings and sculptures are
primarily intended for aesthetic consideration, and thus do often qualify as art. The point is not to make
blanket bans or disqualifications of certain forms or types of art, but rather to show how many individual
examples or instances of certain kinds of works may be disqualified from the classification art, or at the
very least are much more suspect in their status.
Out of architecture, music, and film I think examples of architecture are most vulnerable to
disqualification from the classification art, as they are kinds of works most clearly intended primarily for
something other than aesthetic consideration. Examples of architecture include things like houses, office
buildings, skyscrapers, bridges, churches, stores, and so on. I would claim that all of these examples of
architecture are primarily intended for something other than aesthetic consideration, and therefore do
not qualify as art. That is not to say that a person cannot aesthetically consider, appreciate, or evaluate
these types of architecture, but merely that such consideration is not what they were primarily created
for. Office buildings, skyscrapers, stores, and houses, for instance, are primarily intended to
contain/shelter certain things. Office buildings and skyscrapers house businesses. Stores contain
products to be sold to consumers. Houses hold families and their belongings. Bridges are primarily
intended for providing a route for transportation over a body of water or absence of land. Churches and
other religious buildings are primarily intended as places for believers to gather together and worship.
In creating a piece of architecture a designer may put a lot of thought into making the structure
attractive, but it often remains the case that it is not being constructed so that it can then be evaluated
aesthetically. Pieces of architecture often serve much more mundane and practical functions. Though
the list of examples I gave earlier no doubt does not exhaust the possible kinds of architecture out there
it does account for many of the kinds of architecture we typically encounter in everyday life. War
memorials, statues, and the monuments in D.C. might also be disqualified from the classification art.
One could argue that they are primarily intended as a tribute to the past. They are intended to remind
15

us what came before, to mark or commemorate a past event. We can aesthetically appreciate and
evaluate these things, but once again they might be primarily intended for non-aesthetic purposes.
We might raise the three questions discussed in section one, this time in reference to
architecture. The structures built are indeed artifacts, and they could be appreciated, considered, and
evaluated. A person could, if they wanted to, appraise the design of a structure. They could consider its
color, the material it is made from, how that material is shaped. But this alone is not enough. The
structure must be primarily intended for this for it to count as art. Intended by whom? In the case of
architecture, the idea for a structure like an office building, bridge, school, or store, does not often come
from an artist, designer, or architect. It often comes from city planners, developers, or people from the
business world. They intend the structure to fulfill some function or purpose, and so they hire an
architect and/or a designer to come up with something that fulfills that purpose. The person actually
coming up with the design of the structure is working under the direction of those who had the original
idea, those putting up the money. The designer’s intentions are subordinate to those of the people who
hired them. This does not mean that the designer cannot work with aesthetic intentions. Those doing
the hiring could primarily intend one thing, while the designer they hired could primarily intend another.
But the designer will have to construct something that first fulfills the demands of those that hired
them, otherwise their design will be rejected. I think my reluctance to grant architecture art status
largely comes from the fact that the architect is not hired to create art. That is, those hiring are likely not
interested in the designer/architect creating a work of art. They want something much humbler i.e. a
sheltered environment to be used for one purpose or another. That is not to say the designer/architect
cannot subvert this intention, and instead work primarily with the aesthetic in mind.
Along with architecture, I am skeptical of the art status of most films/movies. Also like
architecture, films no doubt are artifacts that may be aesthetically considered, appreciated, and
evaluated. Unlike architecture, films would likely be categorized by Urmson as complex works of art.
16

Like Hamlet, films are complex narrative works, and thus require different grounds for evaluation. When
evaluating architecture, as with the rosebush, our grounds are the sensible qualities, as well as the nonaesthetically desirable qualities. Films, on the other hand, would be evaluated on much more general
grounds. As with Hamlet, we could look at a films style and characterization. In addition to these
grounds, we could consider the framing, the lighting, the art direction, and many more film-specific
qualities when aesthetically evaluating a film. For example, there is a famous opening scene in the 1958
noir Touch of Evil. The scene is what is known by film fans as a oner, a single uninterrupted shot lasting
much longer than that of conventional shots. In the scene, a man starts the timer on a bomb, and then
places the bomb in the trunk of a car. A couple get into the car and the camera then follows the car
down a street until several minutes later the camera stops. The car continues out of frame, and then
explodes off-screen. The smooth, uninterrupted style of the shot and the way it builds tension is
perennially appreciated and praised by film critics and fans. This is one example of what we might look
at when aesthetically appreciating a film.
One other example. I just recently stumbled across social critic Camille Paglia, who in several
online videos makes an energetic and passionate declaration that the finale of George Lucas’ Star Wars:
Revenge of the Sith movie is the most powerful and significant work of art in any genre in the last thirty
years. The finale involves a lightsaber duel on a lava planet, followed by the birth of Luke and Leia
Skywalker and the persona of Darth Vader, and ends with Jedi Kenobi handing off baby Luke to his aunt
and uncle, who then peer off into the twin-sun sunset of their desert planet Tatooine. I saw this movie
in the theaters. Like most people I would say, I was not there to aesthetically consider or evaluate the
film. I wanted to be entertained, and I certainly was by the exciting duel in the finale. I saw it as mere
entertainment, Camille saw it as a work of art. I do not know the intentions George Lucas worked from
so I do not know if the film would actually qualify as art under Urmson’s definition. At any rate, when
she praises it she talks about things like its great control of tone, how the duel plays like grand opera,
the movements of the duelers as Dance Theater, the destruction of
17

the mining facility on the lava planet as the theme of the destruction of industry. I think this is another
example of the aesthetic consideration of a film. What I did when I first saw it in the theater certainly
was not.
Films, like architecture, are artifacts that can be evaluated, considered, and appreciated
aesthetically. However, I would argue that, as in the case of architecture, many films are not primarily
intended for this. Many if not most films are not primarily intended for aesthetic consideration, and
therefore many films would not qualify as art.
We must once more look at whose intentions factor in to the making of the work. When it
comes to making films there are often two different forces behind the project, as with architecture. You
have the creatives e.g. the writer, the director, and then you have those people putting up the money to
finance the work e.g. studio executives, producers, the independently wealthy. Though in the case of
film it is much more common for the creative to come to those with money than it is in the case of
architecture. Sometimes a movie studio takes the initiative. A studio may purchase the rights to a
character or an already established franchise and then seek out and hire writers and directors to come
up with a film based on those purchased properties. But there are also those projects where a creative
will bring a potential movie idea they have come up with to a studio and then try to get them to invest in
it. Lastly, a creative may seek to raise the money they need on their own, as is the case with
independent or indie films.
In the first case the vision is that of the studios and they hire creatives to realize that vision.
They will often take more of a role in directing and determining the course of a film. In the second two
cases the vision is that of the creative, who will more or less get to execute their plan for the film. This is
important because it determines who we must consider when trying to discover the primary intention
behind a film. If the studio or investor is taking a much more active role in the production of the film,
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like in the first case, then their intentions must be considered along with those of the director, writer/s,
and so on. If the creative is essentially given free reign, or does not have to answer to executives or
investors, then only their intention must be considered. The point is not that the involvement or lack of
involvement of a studio rules out the work qualifying as art. The point is merely that the intentions of
those who must be taken into account will vary depending on the project.
With architecture it might be much easier to rule out their being primarily intended for aesthetic
consideration, as they have a clear functional purpose i.e. providing shelter. Film does not have some
functional purpose, and so it is not as easy to rule out aesthetic consideration. Further complicating the
matter is the aforementioned fact that depending on how the film is funded, the intentions of different
people will have to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, I believe there is a clear alternative to
aesthetic consideration. Films are a form of entertainment. As such, I would argue that they are often
primarily intended for exactly that. Films, for the most part, are primarily intended to be enjoyed, not
aesthetically considered, appreciated, or evaluated, and therefore many if not most of them would not
qualify as art.
I am not claiming that all films are disqualified as art. I do not doubt that films have been made
with the primary intention that they be aesthetically considered, appreciated, or evaluated. But it is a
telling fact that many if not most people go to the movies, not to aesthetically consider or evaluate a
film, but to be entertained by one. They want to gain some temporary pleasure or enjoyment from their
viewing. They do not go with the aesthetic in mind. The same can be said about architecture. Many if
not most people understand that architecture can look nice but is primarily intended to serve some
functional, mundane purpose. They understand that buildings are intended to provide shelter, and that
bridges are there to aid human movement across terrain. Architecture (for the most part) is not
constructed with the primary intention that when it is completed people can then stand back and
appreciate and evaluate its design. One might rightly retort that how most people approach architecture
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or films is irrelevant to whether those things qualify as art. For the definition of art given by Urmson,
what matters is the intentions of those involved in the creation of the artifact, not how the audience or
critic approach or understand the work. A person may go to a film purely to be entertained by it. This
does not mean that the film is not art. What strictly matters are the intentions with which the film was
created. We cannot conclude from the fact that many people do not understand or approach films or
architecture as being works primarily intended for aesthetic consideration that those things in fact are
not primarily intended for that purpose. How a person approaches a work is irrelevant to how the work
is intended to be taken.
However, what is of relevance is how those involved in the creation of architecture and film,
among other types of works, understand and approach those things. If people like movie studio
executives, film directors, architects, and developers do not approach their works as the type of things
primarily intended for aesthetic purposes, then those works will not be created with aesthetic
intentions.
I believe that what in this context holds for film also holds for most music. I do not think most
music, especially mainstream music, is primarily intended for aesthetic consideration. As with most
films, I believe that most music is primarily intended for enjoyment, for a person’s listening pleasure.
One may, as with film, aesthetically consider, appreciate, or evaluate any and all music they desire. This
alone is not enough for a piece of music to qualify as art, just as it is not enough for someone to fail to
approach a work of art as art to prove that it was not primarily intended to be taken as such. The music
industry is similar to the film industry in that you have the “creatives” e.g. lyricists and performers who
actually create the music, and then you have the business executives who work for the record label who
put up the money to fund the project. As is the case with film, the intentions of both groups will have to
be taken into account to the degree that each is involved. Not all music is produced by the record labels,
just as all films are not produced by the film industry in Hollywood. Compared to film, with music it may
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be even easier to work outside the industry. If a person were to work on their own, then only their
intentions would need to be taken into account.
So far I have distinguished between merely liking/enjoying a piece of music, architecture, or
film, and aesthetically considering it. I wish to now elaborate on that distinction. One may enjoy
listening to a song, watching a movie, or looking at a piece of architecture. This is not the same as
aesthetically considering, appreciating, or evaluating the work. I have already stated that consideration,
appreciation, and evaluation all contain an element of reflection that goes over and above mere
perception. The difference can be understood in terms of passive and active, passive perception vs.
active reflection. With liking/enjoying one passively perceives the work in front of them. With
consideration/appreciation/evaluation one actively reflects on and engages with the work before them.
This is precisely what Noel Carroll takes David Hume to task for in his paper Hume’s Standard of
Taste. Carroll observes that in Hume’s work Of the Standard of Taste Hume’s idea of aesthetic response
is that of a passive causal effect on the respondent. Aesthetic response is reduced to merely a sentiment
that follows a stimulant. Carroll states, “The form of the object brings about a sensation of pleasure
which itself is a judgment of approbation…This emphasis on the judgment of taste as an effect
characterizes the aesthetic response as essentially passive and non-intellective” (185). For Hume,
understanding and reason are required for the operation of good taste, but are not themselves part of
that faculty, or its exercise. In this way Hume is in the company of the majority of other Enlightenment
thinkers who believed aesthetic appreciation and pleasure to be connected in a way that excluded the
operation of reason.
And yet, Hume’s own account of taste and the role reason and understanding play in it make the
aesthetic response of a respondent seem far more active than Hume concedes. On Hume’s account, in
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order to properly respond to a work one needs to identify its category and purpose through the use of
reason. Carroll writes,
The more that understanding and interpretative reasoning are required before the
right sentiment can be caused, the less persuasive it is to think that the process of aesthetic
response is essentially a causal one, modeled on the notion of an unmediated
perception…Thus it seems likely that part of the pleasure of the aesthetic experience is
grounded in the engagement of the understanding by the artwork…Many of these
pleasures center around the various sorts of discoveries the spectator actively pursues in
regard to the artwork. (186)
A spectator may interact with an artwork, not only through active discovery, but interpretation
and recognition as well. As I stated earlier in the paper these activities contain an element of reflection.
The aesthetic response/appreciation of a respondent does not merely involve a passive perception of
the work. Carroll concludes, “The judgment of taste, therefore, is not essentially a causal effect of the
artistic stimuli on a passive spectator” (186).
Further on in his paper Carroll contrasts liking and assessing, which are conflated by Hume in his
essay on taste. Hume equates taste with merely liking a work, yet this is quite different from the
activities critics engage in when they evaluate a work. A critic’s judgment involves the use of reason, not
a simple statement of preference. Carroll states:
Even from Hume’s essay it should be clear that the phenomena of taste cited in the
beginning of the essay differs from the exercise of taste by Hume’s ideal critics. They do not
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simply state their favorites. Hume’s critics do things like compare artworks with other
artworks of the same form and genre to assess how good a candidate it is of its kind.
(187)
In the same way liking is different than assessing, enjoyment/entertainment is different than
consideration. One may enjoy and be entertained by a work without reflecting on or evaluating it. One
may experience a work without engaging with it.
So far I have talked about kinds of works whose art status I am skeptical of, including
architecture, music, and film. In contrast to these, I am often more willing to accept that works like
paintings and sculptures qualify as art. Unlike works of film, music, and architecture I believe paintings
and sculptures might often be primarily intended for aesthetic consideration. With things like film and
architecture we can find more plausible candidates for intention. I do not think the same can be said in
most cases about paintings and sculptures. When the painter paints or the sculptor sculpts they often
do so with the primary intention that their finished work will be considered and evaluated aesthetically.
They do not intend their work to serve some functional purpose, as is the case with architecture. Nor do
they intend that their work be a source of entertainment for an audience or consumer, as is the case
with film and music. Buildings shelter, films and music entertain, paintings and sculptures...
However, the painter or sculptor might not have a primarily aesthetic intention. They might
simply intend their work to be looked at and enjoyed. They might intend that it make some political or
social statement, or that it merely provoke a certain reaction in the person who sees it. One might also
object that paintings and sculptures can serve as decoration. People often hang paintings on the walls of
their homes. Business offices are often decorated with paintings, sometimes even sculptures. Thus, one
might argue that paintings and sculptures might be intended primarily for decoration, rather than
aesthetic consideration. This is no doubt possible, and for some paintings and sculptures actually the
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case. Some paintings and sculptures, on Urmson’s definition, might not qualify as art. Even if paintings
and sculptures are used merely for decoration, however, this does not prove that they are not art, just
as a person going to see a film to be entertained does not prove that the film was not primarily intended
for aesthetic purposes.
Just as we have done with other artistic mediums, we can distinguish between different cases of
paintings and sculptures. First, we have the painter or sculptor who creates on their own, where they
are the only one involved in the making of the work. Second, we have the painter or sculptor making
something they were hired to by some other individual. Lastly, we have a painter or sculptor working on
their own who then sells or gives away their finished work to a person who then uses it for decoration.
In the second case we must not only take the painter or sculptor’s intentions into account, but also the
intentions of the person who hired them as well, for they have a say in the making of the artifact. In the
first and last cases we need only look at the intentions of the painter or sculptor. In the third case, the
person who buys the work may fail to use the work sold for what it was primarily intended. The
painter/sculptor could intend their work to be primarily for the purpose of aesthetic consideration, and
yet the person who purchases the work might only use it for decoration e.g. to fill space on an empty
wall in their home. This does not mean that the work is not art; rather, the person who purchased it is
misusing the work. Under Urmson’s definition, whether the work is used for the purpose it was primarily
intended is irrelevant; what matters is the intention it was endowed with by its creator. If the paintings
or sculptures were primarily intended for aesthetic consideration, then that is enough for them to
qualify as art.
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I now want to make some clarifying remarks before I conclude the paper. I do not think that if a work is
commissioned, then it is automatically disqualified from counting as art. I think that such works are less
likely to count as art, however, if those putting up the money have mostly non-aesthetic intentions for a
work. And in the case of works like film and music I think this is often the case. The film and music
industry are very commercial and competitive. The bottom line for people financing these projects is
likely financial, with concern for aesthetics a distant second, if that. This difference in commercialism is
what I think biases me towards things like paintings and sculptures, which are much less commercialized,
from what I can tell. However, I should note that a person hired to create a piece of architecture or film
need not intend only what those financing them do. The aesthetic definition allows for more than just
one intention at a time. The person hired may have aesthetic as well as non-aesthetic intentions when
creating a work. What will determine the status of the work is the primary intention.
In this paper, I argued that we could use J.O. Urmson’s definition of art as artifacts primarily
intended for aesthetic consideration to call into question the art status of many works of architecture,
music, and film, among others, that have in the past been taken for granted as being art. I point out that
there are things other than aesthetic consideration that many of these kinds of works might be primarily
intended for. Music and film might be primarily intended for pure entertainment purposes; architecture
for the mundane purpose of providing shelter. Each work must be considered individually. Whose
intentions we look at will depend on those involved in the creation of the work. As the definition
involves people’s intentions, the anti-intentionalist position must be rejected if we are to be able to
figure out the art status of a work. By employing this definition of art we might winnow the field of
certain works, thereby reducing what I feel is the overcrowded classification of art.
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